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First then, to set the scene […] 
 
There is a room, stripped back, bare. Maybe the lights are dimmed. Illumination 
comes from a chain of naked light bulbs — of different colours perhaps — strung up 
somewhat haphazardly … and from the gleam of a spotlight, which picks out two 
figures from the surrounding dark. Two figures — let’s say a man and a woman. They 
pause … then begin to speak. It would be improper to steal the thunder of their very 
first line, so … imagine an ellipsis … the dot-dot-dot of passing time … Two figures 
exchanging visions of the future, swapping narratives of optimism and despair, 
utopian and dystopian imaginings. A man and a woman, illuminated, mid-flow in the 
to-and-fro of exchange: “… in the future, everyone will have brown eyes … or, in the 
future there’ll be no word for weekend … or, in the future small will be beautiful; or, 
in the future no-one will care about algebra or trigonometry or sequence patterns or 
anything mathematical because computers will do it all, no problem; or, people will 
grow an extra thumb for quicker texting, or, people will learn to walk on water; or, 
everyone will speak all the languages of the world, or, no-one will remember the 
seventies … or buses … or takeaways or… dirty weekends”.1 The two continue to 
imagine what the future might be like through an unfolding litany of prediction, 
projection, prospection and prophecy: “in the future; or … in the future; or … in the 
future … or … or … or ” and so on. 
 
What strikes me about Forced Entertainment’s performance, Tomorrow’s Parties, is the 
sense of two distinct modes of future-oriented imagination operating therein — not so 
much the tension between the utopian and dystopian, nor between the possible and 
impossible, nor even between the prosaic and fantastical visions of the future that are 
conjured up by the two performers, but rather that within this work, the future is 
imagined from two quite different temporal perspectives. Firstly, the performance 
speaks of the future as ‘foreseen’ (the future as ‘not yet’ but still imaginable, 
‘projectable’ there in the distance regarded from the perspective of ‘here and now’); 
whilst, secondly, its ‘live-ness’ attests to an ever-emergent future that is endlessly seized 
and inhabited through the improvisatory act of imagining, the ‘near’ and living instant 
of the future (conceived as ‘what now, what next’). The work thus proposes one mode 
of future-oriented imagining within the content of the words that are spoken (“in the 
future …”), whilst another is enacted at a methodological level in relation to how 
(through improvisation) that content was/is arrived at, even arrives. To distinguish 
between the two modes then: through acts of imaginative projection a ‘future-possible’ 
world is seemingly given shape (even scripted) in advance of its occurrence; whilst 
arguably, within the act of improvisation the shape of an unfolding future emerges 
simultaneously to its imagining.2  
 
Whilst the phrase “… in the future” within Tomorrow’s Parties signals towards the 
activity of looking forward to the future (as if it could be imagined to already exist), my 
assertion is that the punctuating interruption of the word ‘or’ (as in “or … in the 
future”) creates the conditions for a very different quality of imaginative futurity. 
Here, ‘or’ serves as both a rupturing and affirmative force simultaneously breaking 
one flow of imagining whilst initiating the possibility of another. Or — the imperative 
to stop, begin again. Contraction of the word ‘other’, the interjection ‘or’ does not 
simply present an alternative to the terms of the existing situation (according to the 
binary logic of either/or, this or that) but instead might be considered as a site of 
repeated and continual intervention and invention (or … or … or). Turning attention 
away from the product (what is imagined) towards the process of imagining, my intent is 
to explore how the creative production of the future (as different or otherwise) is not 
only one of planning or proposing future-possible worlds, but rather emerges through 
a restless capacity to interrupt ‘what already exists’ with an interventionist, insurgent 
‘or’. Taking Tomorrow’s Parties as a point of departure then, I propose to explore how 
the imagination might be conceived as a kairotic capability, an improvisatory tendency 
located at a threshold (the gap or ‘creative interval’) between the ‘as is’ of the present 
and the ‘not yet’ of the future, the live point of ‘seizure’ or decision-making wherein 
the direction of future events might be steered differently, else remain unchanged.3  
 
These two modes of future-oriented imagination (the imagining of a future through 
‘visions’ and projections, and the future imaginatively ‘seized’ within improvisation) 
might be elaborated further through reflection on different conceptualizations of 
futurity. In On Futurity: Malbou, Nancy and Derrida, Jean-Paul Martinon reflects that the 
future is often conceived from the perspective of here and now as that period ‘ahead of 
us’, a space into which one might attempt to peep, peer or gaze, ‘proceed carefully’ or 
even (for the more adventurous) ‘throw oneself’.4 Turning to the French language he 
identifies two different words for the future: le futur and l’avenir. The first — le futur — 
he states, “refers to something distant or remote, possible, or probable … Le futur 
supposes in fact the possibility of projection, predictions, and prophecies. As such, le 
futur is essentially hypothetical, wishful, or delusory … often referred to in sentences 
such as ‘one day, the world will be a better place’”.5 “Or … in the future everyone will 
live in a kind of idyllic garden or … things will be so good in the future Or … things 
will be so very very bad in the future”.6 Whilst le futur is concerned with “what will or 
might be”, l’avenir, as Martinon notes, “is usually translated as … what is ‘yet-to-come’” 
and is “easily captured with expressions such as ‘I’m dreading it’ or ‘I’m looking 
forward to it’, therefore to situations of hope or despair”.7 Martinon differentiates the 
two modes of futurity thus: “one focuses on what the future does or what we do with 
the future [l’avenir] and the other concentrates on what the future is or holds [le futur]”.8 
Though different, both models seemingly intimate towards the future as a linear 
continuation of time where as Martinon notes, time is “always one-dimensional and 
unidirectional; it goes towards the future”.9 Against this logic, he attempts to reinvent 
the term futurity “as signifying something that no futurologist, clairvoyant, or gambler 
could possibly forecast”, by drawing on the radical potential of a third term: à-venir 
(the expression of the ‘to-come’).10  
 
For Martinon, à-venir ‘represents’ an “unhinging”, a “spacing (and) temporizing” which 
“interrupts the present” “breaking up … the measurable linearity of space and time”. 11 
Moreover, he asserts, “à-venir does not stem from the future, but from itself, from a ‘self’ 
that ‘lies’ between radical impossibility (‘what has not yet streamed’) and a future 
historically determined in advance”.12 According to Martinon, “à-venir surges between 
the foreseeable, ‘projectable’, ‘plannable’, and programmable future present and the 
radical future, that is … that which exceeds or is more than this future possibility”.13 
Perhaps then, à-venir corresponds to the gap or ‘creative interval’ between the ‘as is’ of 
the present and the ‘not yet’ of the future; not the ‘not yet’ of the future conceived as a 
continuation of the present, but instead that of a radical ‘unhinging’ or discontinuity. 
Philosopher Antonio Negri conceptualizes the ‘to-come’ as the evental ‘time for 
revolution’, as kairòs: for Negri, kairòs describes “being’s act of leaning out over the void 
of time to-come, i.e. the adventure beyond the edge of time”.14 He argues that “Kairòs is 
the modality of time through which being opens itself, attracted by the void at the limit 
of time, and it thus decides to fill that void”.15 Negri conceives the limit experience of 
kairós as one of “‘being on the brink’, as ‘being on a razor’s edge’”, a point of rupture 
and of necessary decision.16 In this sense, kairós involves the art of brinkmanship, a 
capacity for tolerating the vertiginous experience of the limit’s edge. It is a mode of 
immanent (and imminent) invention taking place at the limit or brink of being, at the 
restless edge of an unfolding eternal.17 Rather than imagining the future as already 
existing (somehow scripted and simply waiting to be inhabited, or like an empty diary or 
calendar, expectant, waiting to be filled), conceptualizations such as à-venir and kairós 
seem to propose the possibility of a radical future, borne of rupture, discontinuity and of 
necessary invention. Indeed, for Eric Charles White, kairos describes a ‘will-to-invent’, a 
form of improvisation based on “adaption to an always mutating situation”, which 
“establishes the living present as point of departure and inspiration for a purely 
circumstantial activity of invention”.18 White argues that “instead of viewing the present 
occasion as continuous with a causally related sequence of events, kairos regards the 
present as unprecedented, as a moment of decision, a moment of crisis”, where “the 
flow of time is understood as a succession of discontinuous occasions rather than as 
duration or historical continuity”.19 In this sense the future happens — meaning both it 
comes to pass, and that it unfolds not through planning or prediction but rather by hap 
(by accident or chance). 
 
Kairos is in fact an Ancient Greek term that has, as White notes, its origins in two 
different sources: archery, where it describes “an opening … through which the archer’s 
arrow has to pass”, and weaving where there is “a ‘critical time” when the weaver must 
draw the yarn through a gap that momentarily opens in the warp of the cloth being 
woven”.20 Kairos thus refers to an opportune or fleeting moment whose potential must be 
grasped before it passes. It describes a qualitatively different mode of time to that of 
linear or chronological time (chronos). Kairos is not an abstract measure of time passing 
but of time ready to be seized, an expression of timeliness, a critical juncture or ‘right 
time’ where something could happen. My proposal then is that whilst one mode of 
future-oriented imagination (projection, prediction, prophecy) conceptualizes the future 
in terms of a chronological continuity, as a linear progression of time extending (often 
inevitably) forward from here and now, the imaginative futurity within improvisation is 
closer to kairos, a will-to-invent capable of leaning into and inhabiting the void that opens 
once that (illusory) continuity is ruptured. Here, then, not only does the interruptive 
force of ‘or’ rupture or disturb the continuity of an unfolding narrative, but it also 
produces an ‘edge’ or moment of crisis, into which new invention is called.  
The interruptive ‘or’ creates discontinuity within the chain of events by endlessly 
stopping one flow of narrative whilst simultaneously inviting another. In Tomorrow’s 
Parties, ‘or’ creates the conditions of interval between one conceptualization of the future 
and another, wherein the performer has to decide whether to continue with an already 
existing narrative, or whether to step off into unknown territory, inventing new lines of 
flight. Sarat Maharaj differentiates between innovation (conceived as the “improvement 
and incremental adding to what is already there”) and a species of creativity that is 
“about discontinuity, about rupture, about production and emergence, and the spasmic 
appearance of something entirely unexpected and new”.21 Indeed, as Simon O’Sullivan 
states, “the rupturing encounter … contains … the affirmation of a new world, in fact a 
way of seeing and thinking this world differently”.22 The bond between rupture and 
affirmation (that I am asserting is present within the interruptive ‘or’) is thus crucial for 
imagining the future as otherwise, contrasting the logic of the ‘negative imagination’, 
that capacity for imagining only a “future without alternative”, or in Franco Berardi’s 
terms, an imagination only capable of mapping the “cartography of the coming 
dystopia”.23  
 
It could be argued that the attempt to ‘see into’ or ‘vision’ the future is an attempt to 
gain some sort of control over that which is unknown or uncertain, trying to ‘foresee’ 
that which has not yet happened, anticipate that which has still ‘to-come’. Indeed, the 
imagining of the future might be a strategy for coping with the overwhelming reality of 
existence conceived as an infinitely extending series of ‘discontinuous occasions’, of life 
lived at the ‘brink’ as ‘now’ opens onto infinity itself. The term apeirophobia — originating 
from the Greek word apeiro (boundless, infinite) — refers to an abnormal fear of infinity, 
the fear of time going on forever, of things that never end; and is remedied by making 
life as predictable or ‘planned’ as possible.24 In some senses, Western culture seems 
affected by this affliction — the imagined landscapes of the future are often already 
mapped out and territorialized. Holidays might get booked a year in advance; diaries 
determine life’s itinerary according to regular twelve-month cycles; life itself becomes 
spatialized as a path or route whose course has already been furrowed. However, rather 
than the capacity to ‘see’ into (and plan) the future from the perspective of here and 
now, the dissident force of a future-oriented imagination (the capacity to imagine things 
as otherwise) requires that the illusory continuity between past>present>future is 
broken, its chain of causality — all is, as was, as will be — disrupted, exposed as fallacy.  
Indeed, before the term ‘clairvoyant’ referred to the capacity for seeing into the future 
(foresight), it referred to a quality of insight, keen perception or clear-sightedness (clair 
[clear] + voyant [present participle of voir, to see], an intuitive ability to see or see-k out 
things as they really are.25  
 
Or, alternatively, the flight of the future-oriented imagination might be conceived not in 
relation to sightedness (insight, foresight, even hindsight) but rather might proceed as a 
form of benightedness, a term which Maharaj uses to describe the creative “journey into 
the unforeseeable”.26 The word ‘benighted’ might refer to the absence of intellectual 
enlightenment, a state of ignorance perhaps, or else in archaic terms the condition of 
being taken over by darkness, by the night. Whilst the practice of imagining the future is 
often described in relation to metaphors of sight (visions, ‘second sight’, seeing the 
future, even ‘looking forward’), to imagine the world differently (to journey into the 
unforeseeable) requires a degree of blindness. The imaginative faculties are in fact 
cultivated in darkness — ‘close your eyes and imagine’.27 Indeed, to truly imagine a 
different future, the faculties of perception by which we come to understand the world 
(as it is) might need to be restricted, limited or otherwise impaired. There are forms of 
seeing which do not belong to the ocular realm. Hélène Cixous reflects on the 
‘benightedness’ of ‘writing blind’, stating, “Whenever I go off (writing is first of all a 
departure, an embarkation, an expedition) I slip away from the diurnal world and 
diurnal society, with a simple magic trick: I close my eyes … At that instant I am no 
longer of this political world … Behind my eyelids I am Elsewhere. Elsewhere there 
reigns the other light. I write by the other light … Night becomes a verb. I night.”28 For 
Cixous, the diurnal is a realm of too bright an intensity, solar daylight “keeps us from 
seeing what is germinating”.29 So, in order to imagine (to see the not-yet-visible), Cixous 
argues for a form of seeing encountered by closing the eyes, withdrawing from the 
visible world.  
 
Imagination might be conceived then as the withdrawal from one world that initiates 
the emergence of another, or as Joyce Carol Oates states, “the act of withdrawing from 
the world in order to create a counter world”.30 Indeed, the imagination not only creates 
‘counter worlds’ but perhaps also is itself a counter-world, itself utopian. For where do 
you ‘go’ when you are thinking, imagining? Elsewhere. Nowhere. Here, utopia is a not a 
‘better place’ imagined to exist beyond the conditions of now, “in the future …”, but 
rather is a condition of the near and now, that ‘no place/no time’ realm behind the eyes, 
accessible via the imagination. Utopia is thus no place, rather a quality of mind, 
interiority. As Cixous reflects: “Let us close our eyes. The night takes me. Where do we 
go? Into the other world … The other side. An eyelid, a membrane, separates two 
kingdoms”.31 An eyelid, the interval or break between ‘what is’ and ‘what might be’, an 
eyelid – like the interruptive ‘or’ — closing on one world, opening onto another. Yet, 
the retreat from reality — towards the reflexive dark light of the interior – is not to be 
confused with escapism or a retreat into the imaginary (that fantasy realm that only exists 
within the imagination), nor is it to be understood as a permanent removal of oneself 
from the world and from others. Rather, the temporary act of ‘stepping off’, withdrawal 
from or renunciation of the world (as it is) is a precondition for certain forms of critical 
thinking.32 For Jean-Paul Sartre, “For consciousness to be able to imagine, it must be 
able to escape the world by its very nature, it must be able to stand back from the world 
by its own efforts”.33 Or, to borrow from Art Sheffield: Zero Hours — “sometimes, to see 
your own situation clearly, you have to go elsewhere”.34 Imagination — the event of 
absenting oneself from the world and its realities, going elsewhere momentarily, in order 
to then return, able to conceive things as otherwise. Or else, a practice of estrangement, 
meaning to ‘turn away’, to ‘keep at a distance’ or perhaps even ‘make strange(r)’ by 
‘unhinging’ accustomed or familiar associations so as to ‘see the world anew. 
 
“Suddenly time falters. First, the head spins, overcome with a slight vertigo … the earth 
gives way and disappears, one sinks back, goes away … (but) where does one go?”35 
Beginning with this image of the fainting subject, in Syncope: The Philosophy of Rapture 
Catherine Clément asserts a critical value for syncopation, described as “an eclipse, 
interval, absence, followed by a new departure”.36 She conceives of syncope as a 
momentary disappearance or ‘cerebral eclipse’, a brief leaving behind of the world and its 
realities to access another, perhaps more enchanted or luminescent, realm. The figure of 
the renonçant (the ‘renouncing’ subject who leaves the village to go to the forest) is a key 
motif within Clément’s philosophy of syncopation. Drawing on the work of Henri 
Bergson she argued that whilst the ‘village’ constitutes a “static and inalterable … 
society”, the ‘forest’ is “open … distracted by newness … On one side, time; on the 
other rupture”.37 However, as Clément asserts, “the journey … from the ‘village’ to the 
‘forest’ is not made with any continuity. Quite the opposite: it is made by ‘sudden 
jumps’, as if human history were capable of dreaming only if broken by brutal syncopes 
and unexpected jolts”.38 Syncope [(sun (with) and kopto (cut)] is borne of discontinuity; a 
missing beat or break in rhythm, the fall experienced by ‘stepping off’ from that which 
came before. For Clément, “syncopation constitutes a political gesture … that is less 
turned to the past than oriented towards openings and the future”.39 The interruptive 
‘or’ creates syncopation, a break in the narrative, an interval where “suddenly time 
falters”. Like the renonçant, a future-oriented imagination proceeds in leaps and jolts. So 
close your eyes, never look before you leap, for the future that is ‘not yet’ cannot yet be 
seen. The imaginative renunciation of ‘what is’ involves — like faith — a leap into the 
dark, the momentary loss of ground, the letting go of what is certain or stable. But it a 
mode of impotency (impuissance) entered electively, in order to conjure a new dissonant 
rhythm already immanent, already ascending to fill the void. Whilst the imagination is 
often conceived through metaphors of lightness and aeriality (blue sky thinking, flights of 
fancy, head in the clouds), fledging thought — the poetical thought of the imagination 
— must first learn to fall before it can learn to fly.40  
 
Yet how might one cultivate this capacity for leaning into the void, prepare oneself for 
a fall? Reflecting on the Ancient ‘practices of the self’, Michel Foucault notes how the 
Ancient Greeks developed a complex system of preparatory training and reflexive 
exercises (askēsis), for testing mind and body through both meletē (meditations or mental 
exercises) and gumnazein or exercitatio (the training of oneself in actual situations). For 
Foucault, the meletē involved the “preparation of thought on thought, of thought by 
thought — which prepares the individual to … improvise”.41 Based on the principle 
‘to get prepared’, the meletē were ‘imagined situations’ or ‘exercises in thought’ aimed 
at training the citizen to act appropriately in even the most unexpected situation. As 
Foucault states, “You had to anticipate the real situation through dialogue in your 
thoughts. One judges the reasoning one should use in an imaginary exercise (‘Let us 
suppose...’) in order to test an action or event (for example, ‘How would I react?’)”. 
Or … if, in the future … then. The most famous exercise of meditation, as Foucault 
notes, is the praemeditatio malorum, the “premeditation of misfortunes and evils” or “a 
test of the worst”. 42 So … if, “in the future, the Earth will get hit, by meteor showers. 
Just little ones, at first, but then, big ones” … then […]”.43 According to Foucault, the 
praemeditatio malorum involved “thinking about the future” as a “exhaustive review of 
evils … not only assum(ing) that the worst evils will occur, but that they will happen in 
any event and are not just possibilities with a certain margin of uncertainty”.44 He 
states that for the Stoics, “a man who is suddenly surprised by an event is really at risk 
of finding himself in a weak position if he is not prepared for it …  When misfortune 
arrives, we should never be able to say, ‘I didn’t expect it’. Precisely: ‘you should have 
expected it’, then, you would not have been taken unaware”.45 For Foucault, the 
praemeditatio malorum is thus not so much an exercise in imagining the future, as one of  
“sealing off” or “nullifying the specific dimensions of the future” by “making 
everything possible present”.46 Within this pre-emptive model of future-imagining, he 
asserts, “what is at stake is not a future with its different open possibilities. All 
possibilities are given, or the worst at any rate … it does not involve a future with the 
unfolding of time and its uncertainties.”47 Herein, lies the precautionary logic of the 
future-oriented imagination intent on conceiving of things before they happen, the 
futurity of prediction, perhaps even of ‘risk assessment’, risk management, or … “In 
the future, the world will just be run by insurance companies … you know, because 
something might happen to you”.48  
 
To prepare oneself for the unknown future can be conceived then as a preventative 
measure, an attempt to anticipate the unforeseen so to limit its damage, planning a 
course of action for every eventuality so as not to get caught out.49 Yet, unknown 
situations demand a speculative approach for you can never be wholly sure what to 
expect. So prepare yourself well but be prepared for that which resists or exceeds all 
preparation. Indeed, there are practices whose anticipation of the unknown future is 
hopeful rather than delimiting. For the artist, to prepare for the unexpected has a dual 
function. It is the gesture of developing readiness (for anything), a state of being at the 
cusp of action, mind and body poised. Yet, it is also an act of scarifying the ground, an 
attempt to create the germinal conditions within which something unanticipated 
might arise. Improvisation involves the cultivation of a contingent form of future-
oriented imagination intent on courting rather than thwarting the unexpected. It involves 
trusting that the right decision will be made when required, confidence that a 
response will be performed intuitively at the propitious time. Yet, true improvisation is 
not based on knowing how to deal with a situation in advance (where the future is 
predicted and prepared for), nor even is it truly a tacit knowledge, for this describes an 
already embodied know-how. To conceive of the future differently requires a capacity 
for ‘stepping off’ or away from what is known or certain (unhinging oneself from the 
‘as is’ or even perhaps leaning into the void ‘to come’), at the same time as suspending 
the desire to fix or firm up the ‘what now, what next’ too hastily, based on the 
experience of what one already knows. It requires a form of imaginative improvisation 
that is activated or emerges simultaneously to the unfolding situation within which it 
finds itself, a kairotic imagination. For White, “kairos stands for a radical principle of 
occasionality”, an improvisational capacity that is ‘contemporary with itself, alert and 
able to adapt to the present occasion’ where the ‘subject must always be in the act of 
creating itself anew’.50 Kairos thus describes a moment of opportunity and the capacity 
for seizing that opportunity through inventive means, the improvisation of new lines 
of flight. 
 
A future-oriented imagination is often articulated in a subjunctive mood which for 
Victor Turner expresses wishing, desiring, hypothesis or possibility: he states that the 
subjunctive “is a world of ‘as if’ … It is ‘if it were so’, not ‘it is so’”.51 Whilst imagining 
the future can be undertaken as a way of planning how one might respond to the 
unexpected — performing ‘as if’ in order to conceive of the ‘if, then’ — within 
Tomorrow’s Parties this causal logic seems suspended, kept at bay. Each ‘in the future 
…’ narrative lasts only as long as the thread remains dynamic, aleatory. The work 
unfolds as a meditation or exercise akin to the Ancient meletē, ‘Let us suppose ...’, 
whilst refusing to further elaborate the narrative with ‘How would I react?’. Each 
developing proposition is duly cut short by the interruptive ‘or’ — stop, begin again. 
Rejecting the teleology of narrative (the pressure of destination or end-point), the 
continual imagining and re-imagining of the future is performed as rehearsal, the 
flagging of possibilities, or else as an exercise through which to practice and respond 
to the interruptive force of ‘or’. More than a term for simply holding a string of 
alternatives together, ‘or’ becomes the site at which a sense of the devising process — 
the process of improvisation — is perhaps most articulated. The ability to imagine the 
interruptive ‘or’ is a precondition for the act of imagining things otherwise. ‘Or’ 
breaks the illusory continuity of the future conceived as an extension of the present — 
all is, as was, as will be — by creating an opening, an interval, the opportunity for new 
lines of flight.  
 
There is new political imperative to the act of imagining. In contemporary times, the 
imaginative capacity to conceive of the interruptive ‘or’ becomes increasingly critical, 
for the rhetoric of neoliberalism is one of inevitability, of a ‘future without alternative” 
or according to Paulo Friere neoliberalism operates a form of “cynical fatalism and 
(an) inflexible negation of the right to dream differently, to dream of utopia”.52 The 
neoliberal future is presented ‘as is’ the present, unchanging and unchangeable. Or, 
“in the future … things will be pretty much the same as they are now. There’ll still be 
a huge imbalance between rich countries and poor countries. There’ll still be people 
with lots of opportunities and people with none. People who’ll starve and people 
who’ll get by”.53 To imagine the interruptive ‘or’ is thus a form of resistance to 
neoliberalism’s logic of ‘no alternative’, an ethical practice that refuses to simply 
accept things as they are, a practice grounded in the hope that things can be different. 
The critical faculty of the imagination is thus key in order to conceive of the future as 
otherwise, imagining alternative narratives in a world where we are conditioned to 
imagine that there are none. Moreover, the dissident potential of the imagination is 
not so much in what is imagined (“…in the future”), but rather by fact that it persists in 
doing so (or…or…or), continuing restlessly against the odds. 
 
Emma Cocker, copyright, 2013. Written and presented as a key-note for In Imagination: The 
Future Reflected in Art and Argument, University of Sheffield in conjunction with Forced 
Entertainment’s UK premiere of Tomorrow’s Parties (part of Art Sheffield: Zero Hours, 2013). No 
part of this text can be reproduced without the author’s permission. See http://not-yet-
there.blogspot.co.uk/ 
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